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Available online 7 January 2009Sustainability science poses severe challenges to classical disciplinary science. To bring the
perspectives of diverse disciplines together in a meaningful way, we describe a novel
methodology for sustainability assessment of a particular social-ecological system, or country.
Starting point is that a sustainability assessment should investigate the ability to continue and
develop a desirable way of living vis-à-vis later generations and life elsewhere on the planet.
Evidently, people hold different values and beliefs about the way societies sustain quality of life
for theirmembers. The first step, therefore, is to analyze people's value orientations and theway
inwhich they interpret sustainability problems i.e. their beliefs. The next step is to translate the
resulting worldviews into model-based narratives, i.e. scenarios. The qualitative and
quantitative outcomes are then investigated in terms of associated risks and opportunities
and robustness of policy options.
TheNetherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL) has followed thismethodology, using
extensive surveys among the Dutch population. In its First Sustainability Outlook (2004), the
resulting archetypical worldviews became the basis for four different scenarios for policy
analysis, with emphases on the domains of transport, energy and food. The goal of the agency's
Sustainability Outlooks is to show that choices are inevitable in policy making for sustainable
development, to indicate which positive and negative impacts one can expect of these choices
(trade-offs), and to identify options that may be robust under several worldviews. The
conceptualization proposed here is both clear and applicable in practical sustainability
assessments for policy making.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V.Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Keywords:
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Scenarios1. Introduction
Begin to make order, and names arise.
Names lead to more names –
And to knowing when to stop.
Lao Tzue Vries).
CC BY-NC-ND license.The idea of sustainable development reflects one of the
leading aspirations of humankind in the 21st century, not
unlike the idea of socialism in the early 20th century and
the Declaration of Human Rights after World War II. The
words “sustainability” and “sustainable development,” how-
ever, have got an eerie ring and risk becoming just another
one of those buzzwords with a lifespan of a decade, at the
most. Hence, the importance of working on appropriate
operationalizations.
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thought to be applied by establishing an ecologically or
environmentally desired or target value. A formal indicator
of sustainability would then measure the difference in the
actual and the desired time path of the selected variable, often
related to some reconstructed pre-industrial “natural” situa-
tion. In the 1990s, the interference by social scientists and
notably economists made it clear that the setting of such a
desired or target value in relation to sustainable development,
could not legitimately be based on ecological-environmental
criteria alone. First, there was a choice to be made of which
indicators to use— should not economic and social aspects be
part of the decision-making, too? Second, if there is agreement
on the indicators, their future desired or target levels have to
be – at least partly – the outcome of a societal negotiating
process that is informed, but not determined by scientific
assessments of risks and uncertainties related to the possible
crossing of critical thresholds. Moreover, such an outcome
could be renegotiated at anymoment, in the face of changes in
knowledge and values. These considerations have led econ-
omists to argue that the quest for sustainable development
can be founded onwelfare economics and approaches, such as
societal cost–benefit analyses. Scientists with a background in
ecology but also in institutional economy and other social
sciences tend to disagree, bringing in their own observations,
concepts and theories.
It is against this background that the Netherlands Environ-
mental Assessment Agency (PBL)1 has developed its own
methodology for sustainability assessment. The word “metho-
dology” is understood here to be a context-specific combination
of formal, analytical methods (tools, models) and participatory
methods (expert elicitation, games). The objective of the
methodology is to assist in the construction of more compre-
hensive and adequate models of (non-)sustainable develop-
ment and to helppoliticians and citizens to formulate strategies
for action. In this paper, we communicate the sustainability
assessment methodology that was developed at the Nether-
lands Environmental AssessmentAgency andwas applied in its
First Sustainability Outlook (MNP, 2004; van den Heiligenberg,
2005; Petersen, 2006a). The paper proposes a truly transdisci-
plinary methodology and starts with a sketch of the conceptual
framework, followedbya reflectionon thenotionsof values and
beliefs. Subsequently, the construction of scenarios on the basis
of worldviews and models is presented. We end with a
discussion of how the methodology has been and can be used
in (public) policy on sustainability issues.2. Sustainable development and quality of life
Hundreds of definitions of sustainable development have
been given since the notion emerged in the 1980s, as a
desirable guiding principle for the world community. To
highlight the inherent pluralism in this notion, we consider1 The Dutch name of the agency is currently “Planbureau voor
de Leefomgeving” (acronym PBL). The agency made part of the
Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the Environment
(acronym RIVM) until January 2006 and used as its Dutch name
“Milieu- en Natuurplanbureau” (acronym MNP) until May 2008.sustainable development to be a quest for developing and
sustaining “qualities of life.” In this way, it encompasses the
subjective and objective dimensions of human well-being,
inviting a truly transdisciplinary approach. Thus, people
should act here and now in such a way that the conditions for
a (decent/high) quality of life later and elsewhere will not be
eroded. The nexus between sustainability and quality of life is
the degree to which developing and/or maintaining a quality
of life for a given (human) population has consequenceswhich
impair the options for developing and/or maintaining an
aspired quality of life, later and/or elsewhere. Continuation
and allocation are, thus, keywords around the kernel of the
ends–means field of tension.
There is a long history of reflecting on the tension between
ends and means. The keyword may be scarcity. Is scarcity an
ontological fact or is it a social construct, pre-eminent in
certain times and places? In ancient societies, needs surely
structured social order to some extent: priests played a role in
securing food during periods of bad harvests, while farmers
and soldiers had a sometimes troublesome alliance in the
search for food and security. In modern times, the ends–
means connection has become looser and more complex for
large parts of the population. Scarcity is increasingly seen as a
socio-psychological construct, with values and knowledge as
affective and cognitive mediators in ends–means configura-
tions (Douglas et al., 1998).
The scientific discipline par excellence to deal with ends and
means is economic science: the dismal science which “studies
human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce
means which have alternative uses” in the 1932 description of
Robbins (1935). In welfare economics, the study of the ends–
means relationship is operationalized by reducing human
needs and wants to known preferences of individuals, with
optimizing behavior under known constraints. Utilitarianism
extended it to the societal objective of “themost happiness for
the largest number of people.” The formal notion of welfare is
empty: it makes no value judgments about which ends are
met. Its focus is on efficiency and means rationality – the
optimization – and on regulation of individual behavior that is
considered dangerous or undesirable by the community
(criminal, immoral etc.) – the constraints. Behavior, if not
regulated, gives rise to negative “externalities.” The socialist
and environmental movements were and are both, in a way,
corrections of too narrow a notion of welfare.
The notion of welfare has also been criticized within
economic science (e.g., Sen, 1982) for its insistence on the
“neutrality assumption” – that is, that when states of affairs
are compared their character should not matter directly; only
individual welfares in those states matter – and now more
attention is given, both in economics and in other social
sciences, to the broader notion of “quality of life” or “human
well-being” (e.g., Nussbaum and Sen, 1993; Dasgupta, 1993;
Cobb, 2000; Costanza et al., 2007). As a concept, quality of life is
less “empty” than the concept of welfare, where it recognizes
that personal needs and wants are at least partly the outcome
of continuous interaction among human beings and are
intrinsically social and systemic (see, e.g., Douglas et al.,
1998, p. 259).
An explicit attempt to operationalize a broader notion of
quality of life has been given by Sen in what is called the
Fig. 1 –Conceptual framework for sustainability assessment.
1008 E C O L O G I C A L E C O N O M I C S 6 8 ( 2 0 0 9 ) 1 0 0 6 – 1 0 1 9capability approach (e.g., Sen, 1993). The core concept here is a
person's capability, that is, what a person might wish and is
capable to achieve. Capabilities are opportunities, a set of
options from which an individual can choose. A realized
option is called a functioning, that is, something peoplemanage
to do or be in leading their life. Thus, a person's capabilities
reflect the alternative combinations of functionings which he
or she can realize (Nussbaum and Sen, 1993, p. 31). There is
empirical evidence for the fact that not only realized but also
non-realized options contribute to the experience of a good
quality of life — hence, both capabilities and functionings
matter. The capability approach connects the subjective
experience of a good quality of life (freedom to choose and [not]
realize ends) with the objective resource-oriented aspects
(means to realize ends) (cf. Costanza et al., 2007). Well-being
(or happiness) is derived from the individual's choice of
functionings, but the choices available are given with the
capabilities which, in turn, depend on (access to) resources.
The conversion of resources into capabilities has a personal,
as well as a collective (environmental, social, institutional)
dimension (see, e.g., Ibrahim, 2006). An unstable climate,
polluted drinking water or a corrupt police force are examples
of limitations to capabilities and, hence, to functionings in the
environmental and institutional (or governance) domain.
Another approach of the tension between the physical and
social/psychological, the objective and the subjective is the
Human Scale Development (HSD) theory (Max-Neef, 1991). It
starts from three (normative) postulates: development is
about people and not about objects; the best development
process is one that allows the greatest improvement in
people's quality of life; and quality of life depends on the
possibilities people have to adequately satisfy their funda-
mental human needs. As in the capability approach, the HSD
theory explicitly recognizes that (the satisfaction of) needswill
influence (the satisfaction of) other needs, in terms of
effectiveness and over time, and that (the satisfaction of) the
needs of an individual will influence and be influenced by
those of others.
The capability and HSD approaches broaden the notion of
(economic) welfare by including options for fulfilling needs
and wants and by recognizing the multiple interactions
between them. Both approaches can and should be extended
to group or collective capabilities, to include the social and
systemic aspect of a satisfactory life (Stewart, 2005; Ibrahim,
2006). Yet another way to approach quality of life is to ask
people directly whether they are (un)happy and (dis)content
with their life – the SubjectiveWell-Being (SWB) approach (see,
e.g., Veenhoven, 1996; van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004).
Extensive happiness survey outcomeshave been published for
individuals and as aggregates for nations (e.g., see World
Values Survey and European Values Study, analyzed for
changes in people's basic values and beliefs by Inglehart and
Welzel, 2005). One of the findings for the USA and the UK, is
that the fraction of happy people has hardly changed over the
last half a century despite a threefold increase in income. It
should be noted, however, that as a consequence of the way
happiness is measured, happiness data over time constitute a
relatively insensitive measure of quality of life (Johns and
Ormerod, 2007). Still, the empirical evidence suggests that
income plays only a partial and indirect role in the sevenfactors that really matter for an individual's experience of
“being happy,” in order of importance: family ties, financial
situation, work, social environment, health, personal freedom
and philosophy of life (Layard, 2005). This has been a recurrent
theme in economic science — for instance, Scitovsky (1976)
argued that quality of life suffered from an overdose of
comfort and safety oriented consumption activities at the
expense of more challenging and joyful elements.3. A conceptual framework
In this paper, we propose the scheme of Fig. 1 as the
conceptual framework for sustainability assessment metho-
dology. On the one hand, there are the natural (physical)
resources. Engineers focus on the knowledge and skills
(technology) to use them. Ecologists call this part the life-
support system, which provides ecological/environmental
services. Both propose physical indicators as part of the
quality of life or the system. This means-oriented approach
tends to focus on observable resource opportunities and
constraints. It has a certain objectivity, at the cost of excluding
the experiential aspect. The natural “unit” of study appears to
be the “social-ecological system,” defined by the Resilience
Alliance (www.resalliance.org) as being an integrated system
of ecosystems and human society with reciprocal feedback
and interdependence.
On the other hand, there is the subjective experience of
well-being. This ends-oriented approach emphasizes the
subjective individual experience. Social scientists derive it
from questioning individuals, with the associated methodo-
logical problems. Economists have joined efforts and con-
structed indicators using social-economic statistical data (see,
e.g., Nourry, 2008; Distaso, 2007). Their implementation will
increasingly be based upon social survey data, to include the
subjective element. In this case, the natural “unit” of study is a
culture which, for historical and statistical reasons, in practice
often means: the nation-state.
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ground in Fig. 1 needs to be worked out. It is the domain
between the natural sciences (bottom) and the social sciences
(top). Some economists argue that welfare economics covers
this middle ground with all that is needed for the discourse on
sustainable development (see, e.g., den Butter andDietz, 2004).
Like Sen (1993), Dasgupta (1993) and others, we disagree.
Welfare economics reduces human behavior, if not in theory
then in application, to the individual person optimizing to
satisfy unmet desires in the form of rankable preferences,
narrowing capabilities to a person's purchasing power in the
market. Not surprisingly, income is the indicator par excellence
in this approach. The capability–functionings approach offers
a broader ends–means connection, but, like other well-being
oriented approaches, it is faced with the empirical difficulty of
measurement (Saith, 2001, and references therein). One of the
theoretical and empirical problems is the interaction between
capabilities. This is particularly evident at the societal level,
where limited resources have to be allocated to needs, such as
health and education, and where the provision of one affects
the nature and effect of others. The same holds for function-
ings, where realized behavior by one person causes external-
ities which influence the capabilities and functionings of
others. These issues are, of course, well-known in economic
science and its applications.
However, even if we are able to agree upon a list of
capabilities and on ways of measuring functionings for a
particular group of people, connecting these with sustainability
issues is still not straightforward. For capabilities to exist, people
need to have access to resources and the skills to use them and
they need to find ways to deal with externalities. Some aspects
of the present environmental quality, for instance, absence of
pollution, can be considered to be a constituent of the present
quality of life (see, e.g., Distaso, 2007). However, how to
conceptualize the connection between the present quality of
life and its impact on the future quality of life through, for
instance, changing environmental quality, is less straightfor-
ward (Robeyns and van der Veen, 2007). This is even more
difficult if oneusesabroader notionof sustainability and tries to
deal with issues of economic stability and social coherence.
Another conceptual problem arises from the fact that, in order
to realize capabilities in the formof functionings, peopleneed to
have information about these functionings and about the
consequences of choosing them.
At this point, we propose to introduce worldviews as the
linchpin between resources (and their conversion to capabil-
ities) on the one hand and individual and collective behavior
(as realized capabilities or functionings) on the other. World-
views are defined here as being combinations of value
orientations and world interpretations, at the individual
level. Subjective well-being is then perceived to be a result of
the dynamic development of individual and collective aspira-
tions under resource and systemic constraints. The first
argument for this is that insights into people's value orienta-
tionswill give an indication about which capabilities/function-
ings are the most preferred — including the balance between
individual and collective, or the market and the government.
The second argument is that people's actual choices in favor
of capabilities/functionings depend, in a sustainable develop-
ment context, on their understanding of how their choicesaffect the (future) quality of life for themselves, as well as for
people living in the future and/or elsewhere. Such an under-
standing can be formalized into a model (broadly defined) and
will be denoted here as a cognitive or mental map.
Individual behavior has collective manifestations in
society – the micro-macro tension. In our framework, the
individual values and cognitive maps are translated into sce-
narios, that is, model-based narratives (or storylines) (de Vries,
2007). This is done on the basis of an assumption which, in a
limited way, is corroborated empirically, namely that a
dominant worldview can plausibly be associated with parti-
cular events and behaviors in the system under consideration.
The actual introduction of worldviews into the narrative is
done by choosing particular sets of model parameter/relation
assumptions (see, e.g., de Vries et al., 2000; de Vries, 2001). A
last ingredient is represented by “autonomous” develop-
ments: those system events and behaviors which are not
explicitly considered part of the scenario exercise. Examples
are random events such as natural disasters or trends in
natural systems, which seem inevitable and are only partly
known and possibly anthropogenic, such as climate change
impacts. It may also be a mixture of both, as in the case of
technological breakthroughs. In the following sections, wewill
deal with values, cognitivemaps and scenarios, inmore detail.4. Values and their measurement
The idea of quality of life is inherently linked to what people
value. The notion of value is a complex one and definitions
abound in the social science literature, mostly suggesting that
values express a belief about a desired end, which guides
individual action (Dietz et al., 2005; Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004).
We use the definition that “a value is a prescriptive conviction
about desirable behavior and goals, in particular in a longer-
term perspective” (Aalbers, 2006, p. 11). Values tend to change
only slowly, at both individual and societal levels, although
sudden changes (catharsis, revolution) cannot be excluded.
Values can develop and be expressed freely upon reflection
(this, at least, is the case in most societies and situations;
appreciating such freedom is itself an important value). They
can be ranked according to various methods, each with its
pros and cons. Around both personal and societal values,
often there is tension between a desired situation and/or
valued behavior – an ideal – and the actual situation and/or
behavior. The tensions make up the individual and social
forces for change.
There are various ways to measure values. Most widely
known and applied is the survey approach, in which people
are questioned directly about their values. A second approach
is the experimental approach in psychology, which can be
extended with computer simulation experiments. A third
approach is the ethnographic approach with in-depth inter-
views. Because this last one is labor-intensive and because the
experimental one has limited external validity and general-
izability, empirical research of values is predominantly done
using surveys.
There is a growing number of data sets on what people
value, both in the private (marketing) and the public do-
main (governments). As part of the Sustainability Outlooks,
Table 1 – Characterization of “value space”
Axis 1 (left–right) Axis 2 (up–down)
Progress–stagnation Other oriented–self oriented
Openness for
change–conservation
Self-transcendence–self-enhancement
Find your own
way–conformism
Social oriented–individual oriented
Freedom–order We–me
Axis 3 (upper
left–lower right)
Axis 4 (upper right–lower left)
Big, unlimited
world–small, limited world
To give: achieve for others–to take:
achieve for self
Universalism–conformity Benevolence–achievement
Freedom–family life Relations–performance
1010 E C O L O G I C A L E C O N O M I C S 6 8 ( 2 0 0 9 ) 1 0 0 6 – 1 0 1 9extensive value surveys have been held between 2003 and
2006, to investigate the relationship between people's values,
their worldviews and their behavior (Fig. 2; Visser et al., 2007).
Data on thousands of people, over longer periods of time, have
been analyzed, ranking them in a multi-dimensional value
space. Eight value clusters have been derived by combining
them with other datasets. These can be grouped around four
aggregated axes, derived from cluster analysis and 2-dimen-
sional principal component analysis of the survey outcomes
(Aalbers, 2006; Table 1). Such a characterization of “value
space”, with the help of four pairs of opposites, is a useful
heuristic for linking values to the perception of and beliefs
about sustainability issues.
On the basis of interviews, the value clusters have been
given “an identity” in the sense of a qualitative, detailed
description of the most characteristic values, attitudes and
behavior. The clusters have been given neutral and clear
names, and a proximate distribution of the Dutch population
over the clusters has been constructed (Fig. 2). Tests on other
scales, such as lifestyle, (lack of) self-control and egoism,
indicate good correlations with the clusters. For instance,
business-oriented people are most active and in control of
their lives, whereas caring people score highest on affection
and group-orientation. Comparative research on the basis of
different and/or more extensive sets of values, suggests that
the Rokeach-based value space is universal, in the sense of
context-independent and trans-situational. The relative posi-
tion, however, was found to differ between countries.
Other public domain, value-related surveys are the Eurobarom-
eter (http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/index_en.htm)
which, since 1973, has been measuring the evolution of
public opinion within the EU Member States, the European
Values Study (http://www.gesis.org/EN/data_service/evs) and
the World Values Survey (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.
org). An example of an environment-oriented survey is
the poll conducted in 2004 by the European Commission
(EC, 2004). This poll showed that 70% of EU citizens felt that
the state of the environment influenced their quality of life –
however, people felt the same about economic and socialFig. 2 –Value orientations in the Dutch population (Aalbers,
2006, p. 18). Each dot represents an individual respondent.factors, namely 78%and 72%, respectively. This illustrates the
importance of an integrated approach to quality of life.5. Understanding and its formalization
Values determine a person's actions and goals in life,
including the intention andmotivation to perform. Yet, values
are not predictors of behavior: similar behavior may have
different determinants. Value orientations, in combination
with capabilities, do yield insights into the underlying
motivations for particular choices and behavior, such as air
travel, nature walks or participation in NGOs. A crucial link
between values and actions are the cognitive maps, which are
like values based upon a lifelong experience with parents,
neighbors, community leaders and institutions and all kinds
of formal and informal education. Cognition is needed to guide
action, in particular when making difficult and conscious
decisions. A person uses cognitive representations of how the
realization of valued outcomes – in terms of their (expected
and perceived) quality of life – is connected to world events. In
this paper, we do not focus on the various theories in the social
sciences of structuring the complex interplay between values,
beliefs, attitudes, norms and behavior and their social
manifestation (see, e.g., Robeyns and van der Veen, 2007;
Steg and Vlek, 2009; Fehr and Gintis, 2007). For instance,
people are often guided by repetition, imitation and compar-
ison in choosing their behavior (see, e.g., Jager et al., 2000). For
the moment, however, we will confine the discussion to
conscious, deliberate choice situations which are dominant
during periods of experienced change.
What is the role of knowledge in this? In essence, humans
are carriers of knowledge, or better yet, of knowing, which
gradually builds up during their lifetime (cf. Gilbert and Doran,
1994). Knowing is a complex, social phenomenon and always
has a tacit dimension, as far as it is embedded in language
and concepts inherited fromother people (Polanyi, 1962). It is a
mixture of “personal knowledge” and “community knowl-
edge.” In secular western society, science − with its explicit
and formalmethods, rules and beliefs − has deeply penetrated
the latter. The former constitutes a unique individual, emo-
tional and mental appraisal of whatever knowledge is being
acquired.
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cognitive maps –which can be named a mental map or model
or, less formally, understanding, interpretation, belief, con-
viction. This will be difficult, in view of the huge variety of
individuals, the agility of the human mind and the complex
relations with effects and emotions. However, it is possible to
construct a limited number of archetypical cognitive maps
about certain issues and to get an impression of their
adequacy. Here, we introduce a “quality” aspect of knowledge:
the notion of strong knowledge (Groenewold, 1981). It posits
that three elements have been strengthened in the evolution
of scientific knowledge: a formal body of concepts and rules;
observations reframed in an experimental setting; and
hypotheses which connect the observations via logical opera-
tions. A scientific theory becomes stronger and matures by
eliminating “weak” elements, such as false logic. The domi-
nant body of knowledge is called scientific and is largely
shared, or at least accessible, via journals, the media and
experts. The archetypical cognitive maps usually are approx-
imate and simplified versions of scientific insights – and are
called metamodels, “stylized facts,” or simply correlations.
Why is this relevant for the sustainability discourse?
Sustainability science, being an inherently problem-driven
and transdisciplinary activity, has to deal with the dynamics
of social-ecological systems (see Section 3). Its objects of
investigation are systems with non-linear behavior over time,
across scales in time and space, with multiple causes, and are
evolutionary in character. To acquire strong knowledge, in the
above sense, about such complex systems turns out to be
harder than is suggested by the highly successful, empirical
reductionism of the natural sciences. Given this situation, we
must elaborate on the notion of complexity.
In an epistemological framework, one may distinguish two
forms of complexity. The first refers to complexity in terms of
the number, diversity and heterogeneity of the elements of the
system under consideration and of their interactions – the
vertical axis in Fig. 3. The second is about the extent to which
knowledge concerns the external, material world versus theFig. 3 –Aggregate complexity as an increase in diversity of and in
cognition.internal, mental/spiritual world— the horizontal axis in Fig. 3.
The first, vertical axis is rather widely considered a determi-
nant of complexity and is associated with phenomena such as
self-organization and emergence (see, e.g., Nicolis and Prigo-
gine, 1989; Kauffman, 1995). Onemajor impediment tomaking
strong statements about such systems is the difficulty of
performing controlled experiments — as the case of climate
science is showing us, all too well (see, e.g., Petersen, 2006b).
The second, horizontal axis of the external/objective versus
the internal/subjective is an essential aspect of cognitive
psychology and evolutionary economics and is also an
ingredient in the formulation of agents in simulation models
(Dopfer, 2005; Ferber, 2007; Hollis, 2007). It is less common in
discussions on complexity, although here, the tension
between the natural and the social sciences is most intense.
In the context of sustainability science, an increase in ag-
gregated complexity of a system is indicated as a movement
along the arrow from the lower left to the upper right, in Fig. 3.
The lower left represents theworld of the natural sciences and
its applications: the technosphere. Knowledge is acquired in
observation and description and strengthened and made
“objective” in controlled experiments open to reproduction
and falsification. The tools of mathematics – such as
differential calculus – have been and still are essential in
this process. In going to the upper right, one has to probe into
complex systems, such as social-ecological systems, in new
ways. Recent developments in complex systems science and
interactive simulation experiments, offer promising prospects
in this area, in combination with ever-increasing computing
power and data availability. Yet, scientists will be confronted
with uncertainty and ignorance, for a long time to come, if not
forever.
An important consequence of this uncertainty and ignor-
ance, is that cognitive maps about most sustainability issues
are incomplete, controversial and value-laden. Knowledge
about environmental problems is often deficient, as is shown
by people who confuse the ozone hole with climate change.
Dynamic implications in particular, are misunderstood byteraction between system elements and in subjective
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nomena, often, are equally obscure. For instance, in a recent
Eurobarometer inquiry, only 1 out of 8 EU citizens gave an
answer which was within the ±20% of correct answers to
questions on economic growth rate, inflation and unemploy-
ment (EC, 2008). One may presume similar results around
scientific facts and insights into social-cultural phenomena.
As indicated before, we like to address this difficult
situation by constructing archetypical cognitive maps which
“we the people” use for judgment. In many situations, such as
when traveling to work or shopping, a simple cognitive map,
based on experiential local information and rules, suffices. It is
adequate. But, for many actions which matter in a sustain-
ability context, peripheral beliefs play a role. For instance, the
belief that eating meat will have negative consequences for
health. Or in a broader perspective, the belief that jobs will be
endangered by the expansion of the European Union. Such
cognitivemaps directly or indirectly guide action and, even for
an expert, it is not easy to validate or falsify such beliefs, if only
because the truth in a complex world is so often context-
specific. These are, in essence, simplifications for reducing a
complex, diverse and contingent reality to manageable
proportions.
To illustrate this point, let us briefly discuss a few cases of
divergent cognitive maps with significant consequences for
the sustainable development path to be followed. A prime
example is the debate on the mechanism of climate change due
to enhanced greenhouse-gas concentrations and the long-
term consequences (IPCC, 2007a,b). The causal mechanisms
have not been completely resolved, yet; the probabilities of
some known non-linear feedbacks remain uncertain — not
mentioning those which are still unknown; and how climate
change will work out at the local/regional level is equally
uncertain for many situations. Another area of scientific
uncertainty and contestation is “the mystery of economic
growth” (Helpman, 2004). Convergence, innovations, trade
and institutions are all known to play a role, but the – often
indirect and proxy – evidence supports quite divergent
assessments. This is similar for the debate onwhich economic
system is themost successful. The traditional economist view
is that the competitive and flexible capitalist system of the
USA is optimal for the generation of welfare. However, leaving
aside the narrowness of the yardstick, even the more social-
democratic coordinated economies of Western Europe have
performed equally well in the period 1905–2004 (Beugelsdijk
and van Hoorn, 2006). There is no “best” institutional system
and their different emphases on, for instance, equity are what
should matter most in comparisons.6. Worldviews and behavior
From the previous framework, it will be clear that the relation-
ship between individual worldviews in a population and their
individual and collective behavior is a complex one. Even if
value pluralism can be established empirically, how to establish
connections with archetypical cognitive maps? And how to
relate the resulting worldview to quality of life? A person may
contextualize quality of life and its development/continuation
in space (here-there) and time (now-later) in an almost infinitenumber of ways, depending amongst others on his or her
capabilities. One of thequestions to be investigated iswhether a
particular worldview coincides with a particular situation of
(access to) resources and capabilities, which in turn influences
behavior and well-being (cf. Fig. 1). In the surveys held so far,
some weak correlations have been established between value
orientations and socio-economic indicators, such as income,
age and education (Aalbers, 2006).
Transport may illustrate the case. For a majority of people,
the preferredway of transport will reflect personal end values.
But the links from values to choice and behavior will be varied
and variable — if only because each person often finds him/
herself in a variety of roles: as an employee you may focus on
speed, as a parent on safety, as a tourist on comfort etc. If a
person scores high on the value orientation broadthinking and
engaged, which correlates well with the instrumental values
of honesty and trust and the end-values peace and freedom
(Fig. 2; Aalbers, 2006, p. 76), his or her actual choicemay include
the argument that theMiddle-East conflict is largely because of
the oil addiction of the West — with terrorism and climate
change as undesirable side-effects. Having a good income and
being sensitive to other peoples' opinions, he or she might
choose a hybrid car. Alternatively, he or she might interpret
peace and freedom as the outcome of personal growth efforts
and, thus, make no connection between values and transport
choices. For other value orientations one can think of similar
divergences.
From a cognitive science/artificial intelligence point of
view, the taskwould be tomake an adequate representation of
a (human) agent with perception, beliefs and goals that are
processed according to different modes, which would then, in
combination with intentions and motivations, lead to action
(see, e.g., Gilbert and Troitzsch, 1999; Phan and Amblard 2007).
Increasingly sophisticated agent-based simulation models
suggest mechanisms behind cooperative action, such as
sudden, rapid changes in public perceptions and behaviors,
and the spreading of diseases, information and innovations
(see, e.g., Holland, 1996; Axelrod, 1997; Janssen, 2002; Nowak
and Sigmund, 2004). Other important developments are the
investigations in experimental, evolutionary and institutional
economics about the design and role of rules and institutions
in managing Common Pool Resources (CPR) (Ostrom et al.,
2002; Gintis, 2005; Fehr and Gintis, 2007). All these develop-
ments refine our insights into the mechanisms which shape
and trigger longer-term collective events and promise major
advances in our understanding of the triangle of value
orientation – world interpretation – behavior (cf. Fig. 1).7. Scenarios for a sustainable future
The aspiration for sustainable development is to achieve
change in behavior of the individual, which – at the physical,
social-emotional and mental-spiritual plane – also has a
collective or societal dimension. Is it possible to translate
empirical and theoretical insights into the worldviews of
individual people, into building blocks for a more sustainable
development path or, slightly less ambitious, into a frame-
work for critical reflection upon real-world events and trends?
We opt for the scenario method, using qualitative narratives on
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other. This method has become widespread over the last few
decades (de Vries, 2007). The many practitioners have given
many definitions and prescriptions (see, e.g., van Notten et al.,
2003).
Here,we define a “scenario” to be a consistent set containing
worldview, storyline, underlying logic and model implementa-
tion. The storyline sketches a world in which particular world-
views will prevail in the societies and regions under
consideration. The identification of the driving forces – “what
keeps it going” – and of predetermined, slowly changing
variables and their critical uncertainties, provide the structure
or logic of a scenario (Schwartz, 1995). It reflects the prevalent
mental maps and indicators of that particular scenario in the
form of a reasoned chain of events. A formal model is then run
with parameter assumptions – in the broadest sense – in line
with a particular storyline and logic (see, e.g., Nakicenovic et al.,
2000; deVries, 2001, 2007). Given a particular storyline and logic,
there are always more possible model implementations – but
they should be different enough from other storyline-logic
combinations to belong to a different “family.” It should be clear
that one cannot “choose” a scenario. A particular agent (actor,
stakeholder) canmake a plan or design a strategy,which is a set
of chosen actions (the more complex the issue and its context,
the more flexible and ambiguous such a set will – and should –Fig. 4 –Scenario logic in the four IPCC-be). However, such a plan is but one element in a higher-level
narrative where not a single (group of) actors can decide upon
which way to go — although an occasional politician, CEO or
military commander may think differently. In this way,
individual and partly shared, collective worldviews are trans-
lated into quantified pathways for important system variables,
such as population size, age and health, income and income
distribution, food and energy supply and costs, etc.
Ideally, the scenario dimensions are constructed as part of the
sustainability assessment, in a participatory setting, with stake-
holder involvement and capabilities to construct adequate
(formal) models of relevant (strong) knowledge. In the First
Sustainability Outlook we have relied on the IPCC-SRES green-
house-gas emission scenarios, using the two dimensions (or
axes) of globalizing versus regionalizing and private/material/
marketversuspublic/immaterial/government (Nakicenovic et al.,
2000; de Vries, 2007). The shorthand names have become rather
familiar: A1 for the market-oriented globalizing world (Global
Market); B2 being its opposite: the community-oriented regiona-
lizing world (Caring Region); A2 for the market-oriented protec-
tionist world (Safe Region); and B1 being the government-
oriented globalizing world (Global Solidarity).
Fig. 4 is an illustration of how a worldview can shape
a scenario, with a focus on economic growth, which is
still widely seen as a precondition for the continuation andSRES quadrants: economic growth.
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thereof, has serious consequences for poverty and inequality
of income and wealth which, in turn, are often thought to be
causal factors in practices of unsustainable resource use. Yet,
there is no generally agreed explanation for the driving forces
of economic growth. Fig. 4 shows the possible divergent
interpretations within each worldview, or scenario, in such a
situation. The Market Forces logic in the A1 world is that
material wealth is the essential part of a good quality of life,
that it can be acquired by specialized skills and a competitive
and risk-taking attitude, that it is ensured by market-driven
economic efficiency, and that government regulation and
barriers to trade – goods, services, capital, labor, resources –
should be minimal. The benefits may accrue to a small part of
the population, but the poor people will benefit also when, in
the future, wealth will “trickle down.” Post-war performance
of the USA is the most visible proof of the correctness of this
view. The enormous achievements of the present-day global
high-tech multinational corporations have only been possible
because of the hard work, ingenuity, creativity and adventur-
ism of entrepreneurs and business people. If these values and
qualities are lacking or obstructed, society will become
stagnant and backward.
But other people may value very different aspects of life:
leisure time, small-scale enterprises, social and cultural
traditions, community, nature (cf. Fig. 4 (B2)). They will
express these values by protecting their small and local
world through cooperation, solidarity, enclosure, and fen-
cing-off intruders. Their civic-society view often clashes with
the Market Logic, where notions such as large-scale and high-
speed are appreciated for their competitive edge. In this B2
world, citizens may acquire an identity by cherishing what is
local — be it their vernacular, the village church or a nearby
forest. Their focus is on local needs and livelihoods, to which
technology and governance should be geared. The B2 citizens
cherish autonomy, but they cannot avoid a growing myriad of
links with the larger world. Much to their discomfort, they are
confronted with alarming stories about dwindling fish stocks,
with water pollution and the threat of climate change, with
displacement of local jobs, with desperate immigrants and
famine. Blaming the A1 and A2 achievers and consumers is
not a solution. Hence, many of them are inclined to go along
with the B1 vision of Global Governance, where international
cooperation and solidarity are needed for solving the large-
scale and long-term social and environmental problems
which the world is facing. This requires strong governments
and institutions, commitment to the provision of basic needs
in health and education, a long-termperspective on the planet
and its inhabitants, and it requires mechanisms for fair
distribution of benefits and costs, including aid and fair
trade. The institutions and diplomacy of the European Union
and the United Nations are their hope for the future.
Many people will dismiss the B1 logic as being a hierarchist
utopia — “just look at the political quarrels, fraud and
mismanagement in the UN organization,” they might say.
Not being able to join the “famous and wealthy” in the
consumer paradise of the A1 world, B1 people may resort to a
kind of realism which is a sometimes weird mix of consumer-
ism, clientelism, nationalism/territorialism and fatalism (A2).
Protectionism, opportunism and bilateralismwill characterizetrade, an inward orientation may emphasize military power,
excessive consumerismmay spur innovations, as well as envy
and conflict, and semi-criminal organizations may penetrate
regional government-business networks. This Fortress-World
logic is fed by beliefs, such as “governments are not to be
trusted,” “they waste your tax money,” “worldwide poverty is
largely caused by overpopulation,” “global firms overpower
local and regional firms,” and “nothing can be done against
climate change, just watch the huge carbon emissions in
China and India.” Yet, as in each narrative, this world also has
a lot to offer to parts of the population – think of opportunities
for local/regional politicians and entrepreneurs and recogni-
tion and security for those who cherish traditional and
religious values, practices and cultures.
Illustrative scenario-based model outcomes are popula-
tion, economic output (GDP/capita), mobility patterns, trans-
port-related air pollution, energy supply and trade, carbon
emission pathways, food supply and trade, and food-related
water pollution. The outcomes have been published widely, in
a variety of projects (see, e.g., MNP, 2004; www.mnp.nl/image;
www.eururalis.eu). Models are run with assumptions quanti-
fied on the basis of the scenario narrative/logic which, in turn,
reflect a particular worldview. For instance, in an A1 world,
GDP/capita keeps rising during the 21st century, which brings
down the birth rate, leading to a stabilizing and then
decreasing world population. In the B1 world the same
happens, but due to different mechanisms. In an A2 future,
the stagnation in trade slows down the innovation rate and,
hence, economic productivity growth, while cultural isolation
retards the demographic transition. Of course, these quanti-
fications are full of uncertainties which have to be considered
(see van Vuuren et al., in press).8. Plausibility, empirical evidence and
social dynamics
What can be said about the plausibility of such narratives (see
Grübler and Nakicenovic, 2001; Schneider, 2001, on the plausi-
bility of the IPCC-SRES scenarios)? Some argue that (neo-) liberal
post-1990 globalizing capitalismhas unleashed such forces that
an A1 future is the only conceivable one, with all three other
scenarios merely representing critical and/or regressive foot-
notes on social and environmental issues which, in due course,
will be absorbed and resolved. Given the enormous concentra-
tion of wealth and power in the hands of those who exemplify
the A1 worldview, they may be right. Adherents to a non-A1
world are thenmerely exercising a critical role: pointing out the
side-effects of market capitalism, such as environmental
destruction, child exploitation, erosion of community trust
and coherence and the selling out of local cultural identities.
Reality ismore complex, though.Much of globalization takes
place in imagined worlds — and much of the (experience of)
quality of life stems fromvery factual, local events, behavior and
structures (Appadurai, 2005). One cannot simply dismiss a
future in which a world government and associated bureau-
cracies (B1), repressive regimesofdictators andwarlords or even
regional/global war (A2), large but resilient rural populations
and their traditional cultures (B2) or novel social-cultural
influences from emerging regions, such as India and China,
1015E C O L O G I C A L E C O N O M I C S 6 8 ( 2 0 0 9 ) 1 0 0 6 – 1 0 1 9will give the future a twist, distinctly different frommodernist-
liberal expectations.
A critical question could be:where is the empirical evidence of
an understandable relationship between worldviews and
scenarios? In the First Sustainability Outlook (MNP, 2004), a
group of experts constructed coherent narratives with images
for the four corners in the IPCC-SRES framework. To test the
coherence and interpretation of the narratives, people were
asked, during a series of interviews and a panel survey, to
indicate the probability of certain consequences in the
ecological, economic and social-cultural domain and their
preferred narrative. The directions of the correlations between
what people value (cf. Fig. 2) and their interpretation and
preference for a particular world narrative, were as expected,
but weak (Aalbers, 2006). For instance, Luxury seekers and
Business people are in the A1 corner, whereas the Broad
thinkers and Engagedpeople are nearer to the B1 corner (Fig. 5).
Of course, many questions remain for future research.
A further, rather fundamental issue is that any narrative
assuming constancy in worldviews and resource-technology
parameters will itself not be “durable” — and implausible, if
extended into the future for more than one or two decades.
This is correct and begs the question of what kind of higher-
order dynamics should be introduced. One view is that
individual and collective value orientations are not at all
leading and that, instead, evolution in the domains of tech-
nology and resources are the prime movers (cf. Fig. 1). There is
indeed evidence of a dominant role of scientific discoveries
and subsequent techno-economic applications as key deter-
minants of world developments (see, e.g., Grübler, 1998). The
relentless penetration of the Internet and mobile phones are
early 21st century examples.Fig. 5 –Positioning of people's value orientations in the IYet, one may also defend the view that the dynamics of
changes in worldviews and the consequences for real-world
events, behaviors and structures, are a key determinant in
future world development. In the last few decades, one can
discern important changes in the appreciation and role of the
political domain (government) in favor of a laissez-faire
market economy; this is, in turn, under increasing pressure,
now that the disadvantages and failures of deregulation and
privatization are becoming apparent.
A simple metamodel of interacting agents can be used to
describe such a higher-order dynamic. Each worldview is
considered an attractor which produces its specific initial
benefits and, upon crowding, problems. Too many adherents
to a particular worldview generate centrifugal counterforces in
response to crowding, as more and more individual people
react with alternative views and actions. Resource conflicts
and technological breakthroughs may then trigger a (local)
avalanche switch to another worldview, especially when the
system already is in a region of instability (Thompson et al.,
1990). In the present context, it means that the preponderance
of a particular scenario storyline shifts over time (cf. Fig. 4).
Our methodology permits an explicit investigation of such a
dynamic (for a preliminary exploration along these lines, see
Janssen and de Vries, 1998).9. Policies for a sustainable world
How useful is our methodology for carrying out a sustain-
ability assessment? The quest for sustainable development
unfolds into a series of macro-problems, which are high on
aggregate complexity and low on consensus in values andPCC-SRES scenario framework (Aalbers, 2006, p. 69).
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lack of transparency and non-linear dynamics and are
associated with post-normal science (Funtowicz and Ravetz,
1990; van der Sluijs et al., 2008; www.nusap.net). Organiza-
tions, and not individuals, are the actors in the societal
networks which run the human world with its macro-
problems – although every organization is the expression of
individuals.
Therefore, a methodology is needed to support the
formulation and design of policy problems and programs of
public, private and civil organizations active in the sustain-
ability arena. If the leadership of an organization, whether it
is a government, firm or NGO, considers a series of past and
anticipated events as serious threats to the quality of life of
(some of) its stakeholders (citizens, employees, members),
this becomes a public policy problem. What can be done
about the undesired state, to prevent, mitigate and/or react
against an unattractive development? We suggest that our
methodology could increase the effectiveness and legiti-
macy of policies, in at least three ways.
The first one is to position oneself in the center of the
worldview and scenario quadrant and, from there, perform an
explicit elicitation of value orientations and construct a series
of archetypical cognitive maps of how the world is believed
to work. A further explication of the resulting worldviews
involves the formulation of hopes and aspirations (utopia) and
fears and concerns (dystopia), as well as their resource base
and capabilities in terms of financial, economic, social and
media power and control (Rotmans and de Vries, 1997; de
Vries, 2001). The acknowledgement of worldview pluralism,
probably the only basis for legitimacy in any modern
democracy, is thus ensured. The trap of reducing the problem
to a single solution for an – illusory – single constituency, is
avoided. Novel tools and methods for involving stakeholders
and expert knowledge, such as policy exercises and simula-
tion games, are a helpful and timely development (see, e.g.,
Duke and Geurts, 2004).
Model-based quantification is the next step, as a check
on consistency and an assessment of implications. Then, one
evaluates the range of available policy options – taxing, sub-
sidizing, regulatory controls, etc. – in terms of their com-
patibility and, therefore, chance of success or failure. For
instance, counting on strict life-style oriented regulation will
meet with stiff opposition and massive evasion in a Global
Marketworld logic. In this way, it is possible to search for amix
of policy measures which is balanced, yet biased in the right
direction. This is all done in order to formulate a policy
program which is robust and resilient in the face of change,
including surprise events in the natural system and sudden
shifts in worldviews.
Such a “strategic” application has been made in the First
Sustainability Outlook (MNP, 2004). In the area of mobility, it
led to the conclusion that a mix of instruments is needed in
order to avoid unrealistic and failure-prone policies:
• Market-based instruments (prices) are robust in almost
all scenarios on the condition that they are legitimized on
the grounds of reducing congestion and environmental
problems;
• Regulation is necessary and effective from a Global Solidarity
(B1) perspective, but it should incorporate the innovations ofthe A1 world and the concern about the local environment of
the B2 world.
In similar fashion, we identified strategic outlooks on
sustainable energy futures. A particularly important recom-
mendation in this area was giving clear price signals, as a way
to address concerns valid in different worldviews/scenarios,
namely: reduced dependency on oil imports (security), incen-
tives for entrepreneurs (innovation) and a commitment
towards the reduction of greenhouse gases (climate). The
analysis also ignited the first debates about the possibly
ambiguous role of biofuels. A third case besides energy and
transportation was that of the trade-offs in the global food
arena. Here, large and difficult to resolve tensions are found
between global concerns and solutions regarding poverty and
biodiversity and their interactions on the one hand, and the
more local concerns about water and soil pollution, applica-
tion of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and animal
welfare, on the other.
A secondway of using themethodology, is that of choosing
one of the scenarios andworking it out in such detail, that pros
and cons become clear. Such a “partisan” exercise will provide
warning signals: which values are promoted, which ones will
be denied and give rise to opposition? Which cognitive maps
have to be communicated— considering the pitfalls of lies and
manipulation? Which strategic risks and opportunities are
part of the narrative and how can models be used to quantify
the more tangible economic risks and opportunities of the
scenario? Which policies are (in)compatible with the pre-
sumed prevailing worldviews? From a public governance
perspective, such an exercise should be done as part of the
public discourse. The polarization by those who criticize “the
powers that be” clarifies the underlying values, beliefs,
motivations and interests.
A third way in which the worldview component of our
methodology can be used, is exemplified in the Netherlands
Environmental Assessment Agency's Second Sustainability
Outlook (MNP, 2007). Instead of using the worldviews
to facilitate deliberation on policy targets, one can start from
policy goals that have already been internationally agreed
upon, such as the European Union's two-degree target
for climate change, the Convention on Biological Diversity's
target for slowing down the biodiversity loss and the
Millennium Development Goals. For the Second Sustainability
Outlook, different policy options for meeting the given targets
were assessed from the perspectives of different worldviews.
This helped to make the likelihood of implementation of
different measures explicit, and made it possible to search for
robust solutions, that is, combinations of measures.
Last, but not least, our methodology serves as a frame-
work for science to promote a more transdisciplinary, less
fragmented approach to sustainable development issues,
thus bridging the three divides of micro–macro, science–
policy and natural science–social science. The explicit
orientation on worldviews in our methodology may avoid a
narrow self-regarding focus and help to overcome the
science–policy divide. Both are real challenges for sustain-
ability science, in view of exciting new insights and data/
tools, on the one hand, and the apparently accelerating pace
at which the human population races towards its destiny, on
the other.
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The transition towards amore sustainable relationship between
thehumanspecies and itsnatural life-support system, isamajor
challenge for humanity in the 21st century. Based on extensive
cooperation with scientists from a variety of disciplinary back-
grounds and intense dialogue in a number of science–policy
interfaces, we argue that an integrated framework for sustain-
ability assessments is necessary and feasible. Its aim is to
develop and continue quality of (human) life elsewhere and
later, within the limits set by ecological and social constraints.
The latter should be grounded in scientific knowledge about
ecosystems, resources and technological developments, while
acknowledging the plural realizations of quality of life by
addressing the subjective values and beliefs of individuals,
conceptually and empirically. We present a conceptual scheme,
whichbroadens theeconomicnotionofwelfarewithcapabilities
and with social and system aspects and which, in this way,
permits a constructive resolution of the tensions between an
objective and a subjective notion of sustainability and quality of
life. The combination of value orientations and cognitive maps
whichmakeupworldviews in this schemeprovides the basis for
the construction of scenarios, that is, model-based narratives.
Thus, sustainability assessments can support strategicdecision-
making, as well as heuristic exploration in complex sustain-
ability related macro-problems. In incorporating explicit values
and ‘facts’, one may hope that respect for diverse views and
interests increases and irresponsible simplifications of the
complex challenges ahead do not gain support. In our view,
these are the preconditions for adequately facing the sustain-
ability transition that lies ahead of us.Acknowledgments
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